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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2(a)-3(h), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT THE RIDGE ROAD 
WAS USED SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF RECREATION 
AND USING THAT FINDING AS A BASIS FOR CONCLUDING 
THE ROAD WAS NOT A PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE. 
The Court' s failure to acknowledge in its decision the fact 
that the Ridge Road was used for numerous purposes, including 
recreation, created an inequitable result for members of the 
genera] public who desire to use the road as access to the 
Sawtooth National Forest. Furthermore, even if the Ridge Road 
had been used solely for recreational purposes, the court cited 
no statute or case law supporting its position that recreational 
use alone is not sufficient to establish a public roadway. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT EVEN 
THOUGH THE RIDGE ROAD HAD BEEN USED IN EXCESS 
OF TEN YEARS, THE USE WAS NEITHER CONTINUOUS 
NOR AS A PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE. 
The Ridge Road is inaccessible during the months of November 
through April, and sometimes until June, due to snow and water 
conditions on the road. The Court committed error when it 
concentrated solely on the use of the Ridge Road during the deer 
hunt season and failed to consider road use testimony during 
other times of the year. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE LANDOWNER'S INTENT. 
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According to current law, the landowner1 s intent regarding 
the status of the road is irrelevant. Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 
44 7 (Utah 1981). 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THE LACK OF 
ASSERTION OF OWNERSHIP OF THE ROAD BY THE LANDOWNERS, 
ESPECIALLY BARNES AND BEATON. 
The stipulation between the parties was that there were only 
two locked gates on the entire road during the relevant period, 
and they were not always locked. These two gates were on the 
Campbell property; there were never any locked gates on the 
Barnes and Heaton properties during the relevant period. 
Testimony presented by Defendant/Appellant ("Appellant") 
indicated that no witnesses observed a locked gate blocking the 
Ridge Road during the times they wished to access the Sawtooth 
National Forest. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER ABUNDANT 
TESTIMONY REGARDING THE PUBLIC'S UNDERSTANDING 
REGARDING USE OF THE RIDGE ROAD AND THE CONCOMITANT 
PUBLIC USE OF THE RIDGE ROAD. 
The public understanding regarding the Ridge Road was that 
it was not only an access point to the Sawtooth National Forest 
but that it was the best access to National Forest Service 
property. Additionally, because of the public perception of the 
purpose of the Ridge Road, the road was continuously used as a 
public thoroughfare. 
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POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CREATE A RIGHT OF PUBLIC 
ACCESS OVER THE RIDGE ROAD FOR THE DEER HUNTING SEASON. 
It was clearly established and stipulated that the road was 
open to the public and used by the public during the general deer 
hunt each year for a period of time well in excess of ten years. 
The Court refused to create a public right of access for that 
period of time each year. 
The applicable standard of review regarding the factual 
issues is whether or not the Court!s findings are consistent with 
the evidence presented, and whether the trial Court abused its 
discretion in finding those facts. The applicable standard of 
review regarding legal conclusions included in the issues 
presented above is whether or not the trial Court reached proper 
and allowable legal conclusions, assuming that the factual 
findings were supportable. The trial Court is granted 
substantial discretion regarding factual findings, but the trial 
Court•s findings must be supported by the evidence presented at 
the trial. 
The Trial Court abused its discretion and/or erred in its 
interpretation of Section 27-12-89 Utah Code, by failing to apply 
that statute properly under the facts and circumstances in this 
case, or by failing to interpret the statute properly. 
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RECITATION OF THE STATUTES INVOLVED 
Section 27-12-89: 
"Public use constituting dedication. 
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period 
of ten years." 
Section 27-12-90: 
"Highways Once Established Continue Until Abandoned. 
All public highways once established shall continue to 
be highways until abandoned or vacated by order of the 
highway authorities having such jurisdiction over any 
such highway, or by other competent authority." 
Section 27-12-2(6) : 
"Highway means any public road, street, alley, lane, 
court, place, viaduct, tunnel, culvert, bridge, or 
structure laid out or erected for public use, or 
dedicated or abandoned to the public, or made public in 
an action for the partition of real property, including 
the entire area within the right-of-way." 
Section 27-12-138: 
"Obstructing traffic on sidewalks or highways 
prohibited. 
(1)... 
(2) Vehicles, building material, or other similar 
things may be placed temporarily on highways in a 
manner that will not impede, endanger, or obstruct 
ordinary traffic, but no vehicles, building material, 
or other obstructions are permitted to remain on any 
highway contrary to instructions from the highway 
authority having jurisdiction over the highway." 
(emphasis added) 
Section 27-12-138.5: 
"Gates on B system county highways. 
(1) The county executive of any county may provide for 
the erection and maintenance of gates on the B system 
county highways in order to avoid the necessity of 
building highway fences. 
(2) The person for whose immediate benefit the gates 
are erected or maintained shall in all cases bear the 
expense of such erections and maintenance. 
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(3) Nothing contained in Section 27-12-138 shall be 
construed to prohibit any person from placing any 
unlocked, nonrestrictive gate across any B system 
county highway, or maintaining the same, with the 
approval of the county executive of that county. 
(4) No gates shall be allowed on any B system county 
highways except those gates allowed by the county 
executive in accordance with the provisions of this 
section, If the expense of the erection and 
maintenance of such allowed gates is not paid or if any 
lock or other device is placed upon such gates so as to 
make them restrictive, the county executive of that 
county shall notify the responsible party that their 
approval is terminated and the gate shall thereafter be 
deemed to be any obstruction pursuant to Section 27-12-
138. 
(5) No placement of gates with the consent of the 
county executive across B system county highways nor 
the maintenance thereof for the statutory period of 
time shall constitute nor establish an abandonment by 
the county or any easement on behalf of the person 
establishing such gate. 
(6) Any person committing any of the following acts 
shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor and, in 
addition, shall be liable for any and all damages 
suffered by any party as a result of such acts: 
(a) leave open any gate, erected or maintained 
pursuant to this section; 
(b) unnecessarily drive over the ground adjoining 
the highway on which such a gate is erected; 
(c) place any lock or other restrictive device on 
such a gate; or 
(d) violate any rules or regulations of any county 
legislative body relating to such gates within the county. 
(7) The provisions of this section relating to 
maintenance and removal of gates over B system county 
highways shall be deemed to apply retrospectively to 
all such gates in existence on the effective date of 
this act." (emphasis added) 
Section 27-12-25: 
"Control of highways, roads, paths, and ways not 
otherwise designated. 
All highways, roads, paths, and ways not designated as 
a federal, state, city, or special highway, road, path 
or way shall remain under the direction of the county 
executive in the county where they are located.ff 
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Section 27-12-26 provides as follows: 
"County executive to keep plats of roads and highways. 
It shall be the duty of the county executive of each 
county to determine all county roads existing in its 
county, outside its cities and towns, and to prepare 
and keep current plats and specific descriptions of the 
same and of such other highways as he may from time to 
time locate upon public lands, which shall be kept on 
file in the Office of the County Clerk or Recorder." 
(emphasis added) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a two-part judgment, in the form of a 
Memorandum Decision, dated July 1, 1997, and a subseguent 
"Decision and Order Clarifying Ruling", dated September 16, 1997. 
Two Notices of Appeal were filed, the first dated July 29, 1997, 
the second dated September 22, 1997. The September 22, 1997 
Notice of Appeal, as stated therein, was not intended to create a 
separate appeal. The matter should be considered as a single 
appeal, with the September 22, 1997 notice filed merely to assure 
the preservation of the appeal on both orders. 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The Memorandum Decision issued by Judge Hadfield on July 1, 
1997, discussed only the Campbell portion of the roadway, and 
concluded that the Ridge Road was not dedicated and abandoned to 
Box Elder County, for the reasons cited therein. The September 
16 decision and order clarified and expanded the Court's earlier 
ruling, making it clear that the Court's conclusions and findings 
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applied to the entire Ridge Road, including the Barnes and Heaton 
portions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Campbells filed suit in approximately late September or 
early October 1996, seeking a Court declaration that a road 
across Campbell property was a private road. Defendant Box Elder 
County had previously claimed that the road was public. 
Campbells also sought a preliminary injunction, and a 
hearing was held thereon immediately prior to the October 1996 
general deer hunting season. Substantial testimony was taken, 
over two days, and the Court granted the public the right to use 
the roadway for the general deer season of 1996, denied public 
access for any other times, and ordered the matter set for trial 
at a later date. 
The roadway in guestion runs across Campbell property, 
Barnes property, Heaton property, and U.S. Forest Service 
property, over a length of many miles. 
Thereafter, Box Elder County filed its Third-Party 
Complaint, naming the Campbell's as third-party defendants, and 
bringing in the owners of the Heaton and Barnes properties, 
seeking a declaration that the entire road was public, thus 
expanding the focus beyond the Campbell property to all of the 
private property owners along the entire length of the roadway. 
At trial, held on May 30, 1997, based on earlier suggestions 
of the Court, the parties stipulated that a transcript of the 
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preliminary injunction hearing would become the trial record, 
along with the testimony of any other witnesses heard on that 
date. 
The parties also stipulated to other matters, including the 
fact that the only locked gates along the entire length of the 
roadway prior to 1994 were the Campbell property gates; no gates 
on the Barnes and Heaton properties were ever locked prior to 
that date. 
The Trial Court!s July 1, 1997 decision held the Campbell 
portion of the road to be private property, but did not make any 
findings, conclusions, or orders directly dealing with the Barnes 
and Heaton properties. 
The Judge's clarification decision, dated September 16, 
1997, held the road over the Barnes and Heaton properties to be 
private property also, for the reasons stated in the July 1 
decision, in spite of the essential factual difference between 
the two sections of road. 
The Campbell property is located at the base of a mountain 
range containing Sawtooth National Forest lands. The road in 
guestion commences (or ends, as the case may be), on Campbell 
property at a point where that property joins with what is agreed 
hy all parties to be a public, county roadway. Actually, there 
are two such points on the Campbell property, about a mile apart, 
the southern-most of which was referred to throughout the 
hearings as the MScoffield access", or the "southern access". 
(Appendix #1) The northern access was referred to throughout as 
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either the "Campbell access", or the "northern access". 
(Appendix #4). Of the two, the Scoffield access appears to have 
been used more heavily, especially during the general deer hunt. 
Attached hereto as an appendix is a downsized copy of defendant's 
Fxhibit One, which was used throughout all hearings as the basic 
reference map. The numbering thereon is enhanced so the numbers 
are visible. The original is part of the Record on Appeal. 
It is important to note that although these are referred to 
as accesses, they may also be referred to with egual ease as 
exits. 
Both the Scoffield and the northern access come together 
(Appendix #7) within one-half mile from their respective 
"junctions with undisputed county roads. From that point, the 
balance of the so-called Ridge Road, as it's name implies, 
proceeds along a ridge through Barnes property, then through 
Forest Service property, then through interspersed Forest Service 
and Heaton property, to more Forest Service property on the top 
of the mountain range. The road runs uphill from the Campbel] 
property, and downhill from the top of the mountain to the 
Campbel1 property. 
From the Forest Service property on top of the mountain, 
going a different direction, is an access or exit referred to as 
"one mile" in the proceedings, which is an undisputed public 
roadway. 
The Ridge Road is impassable by vehicular traffic from 
approximately November through approximately April, and in wet 
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years sometimes remains impassible until June, due to the snow 
and water conditions. Therefore, the primary opportunity to use 
the road for vehicular traffic occurs from approximately June 
through October of each year. 
Beyond (uphill from) the point where the Scoffield and 
northern accesses come together, the road first began as a 
seasonal sheep track, some time in the 1930*s or 1940fs. 
In the mid-1950fs, the Scoffield access portion of the 
roadway was used for quarrying operations. (The quarry is #3 on 
the Appendix.) 
The road originally ran only a few miles, through the 
Campbell and Barnes property and onto Forest Service property, to 
a sheep camp (Appendix #5). The road existed to this point from 
some time in the 1930 fs or 1940*s. In the early or mid-~1960,s, 
or earlier, the road was established as it presently exists, and 
the Forest Service did some maintenance work in the 1960's on 
public and private property portions of the roadway, building 
water bars to divert runoff water from the road itself, thus 
preventing washouts. 
It should also be noted that between the upper Barnes parcel 
(there are two of them) and the lower Heaton parcel approximately 
three miles of the road traverses Forest Service ground. (See 
Appendix, beyond #5, where the road crosses from Section 3 to 
Section 10.) 
The Scoffield access was generally unlocked during any 
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period of the year until 1994 (testimony of LaMont Campbell, 
Record, page 244). The Trial Court mistakenly found the opposite 
to be true in its July 1, 1997 Memorandum Decision (Record, page 
590) . 
In 1993 or 1994, Mr. Campbell erected a sign at or near the 
Scoffield access: 
"The public has abused its privilege of using the Ridge 
Road and property in the area. That's why it is 
closed." (Record, page 94, Defendant's Exhibit #5, 
photograph). 
The Campbells produced witnesses who testified regarding 
Campbell's assertions concerning the Scoffield access and the 
Ridge Road. 
Box Elder County produced witnesses who testified regarding 
their usage of the Ridge Road at various times of the year and 
for various purposes. Box Elder County proffered that other 
witnesses could be called, but the Court expressed a definite 
Jack of interest in hearing any additional testimony from people 
who were using the road during the general deer season for deer 
hunting. 
Box Elder County's witnesses testified that for a period of 
time far in excess of ten years and ending before 1994 they used 
the Ridge Road and never asked for permission, and they also 
testified that no signs were ever present and the gates were 
either not locked or simply did not exist. 
Section 27-12-89 of the Utah Code, which appears in a 
chapter of the Utah Code entitled "Acguisition of Property for 
Highway Purposes", provides as follows: 
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"Public use constituting dedication. 
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period 
of ten years." 
Section 27-12-90 provides as follows: 
"Highways Once Established Continue Until Abandoned. 
All public highways once established shall continue to 
be highways until abandoned or vacated by order of the 
highway authorities having such jurisdiction over any 
such highway, or by other competent authority." 
The word "highway" is defined in Section 27-12-2(6) as 
follows: 
"Highway means any public road, street, alley, lane, 
court, place, viaduct, tunnel, culvert, bridge, or 
structure laid out or erected for public use, or 
dedicated or abandoned to the public, or made public in 
an action for the partition of real property, including 
the entire area within the right-of-way." 
Sections 27-12-21, 22 and 23 divide highways and roads into 
three categories: State Highways, which are called Class "A" 
Roads; County Roads, which are called Class "B" Roads; and City 
Streets, which are called Class "C" Roads. Section 27-12-22, 
referring to Class "B" Roads, provides that they are under the 
jurisdiction and control of county governing bodies of the 
respective counties, to be constructed and maintained by or under 
their authority. 
Section 27-12-138 provides as follows: 
"Obstructing traffic on sidewalks or highways 
prohibited. 
(1)... 
(2) Vehicles, building material, or other similar 
things may be placed temporarily on highways in a 
manner that will not impede, endanger, or obstruct 
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ordinary traffic, but no vehicles, building material, 
or other obstructions are permitted to remain on any 
highway contrary to instructions from the highway 
authority having jurisdiction over the highway." 
(emphasis added) 
Section 27-12-138.5 provides as follows: 
"Gates on B system county highways. 
(1) The county executive of any county may provide for 
the erection and maintenance of gates on the B system 
county highways in order to avoid the necessity of 
building highway fences. 
(2) The person for whose immediate benefit the gates 
are erected or maintained shall in all cases bear the 
expense of such erections and maintenance. 
(3) Nothing contained in Section 27-12-138 shall be 
construed to prohibit any person from placing any 
unlocked, nonrestrictive gate across any B system 
county highway, or maintaining the same, with the 
approval of the county executive of that county. 
(4) No gates shall be allowed on any B system county 
highways except those gates allowed by the county 
executive in accordance with the provisions of this 
section, If the expense of the erection and 
maintenance of such allowed gates is not paid or if any 
lock or other device is placed upon such gates so as to 
make them restrictive, the county executive of that 
county shall notify the responsible party that their 
approval is terminated and the gate shall thereafter be 
deemed to be any obstruction pursuant to Section 27-12-
138. 
(5) No placement of gates with the consent of the 
county executive across B system county highways nor 
the maintenance thereof for the statutory period of 
time shall constitute nor establish an abandonment by 
the county or any easement on behalf of the person 
establishing such gate. 
(6) Any person committing any of the following acts 
shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor and, in 
addition, shall be liable for any and all damages 
suffered by any party as a result of such acts: 
(a) leave open any gate, erected or maintained 
pursuant to this section; 
(b) unnecessarily drive over the ground adjoining 
the highway on which such a gate is erected; 
(c) place any lock or other restrictive device on 
such a gate; or 
(d) violate any rules or regulations of any county 
legislative body relating to such gates within the county. 
(7) The provisions of this section relating to 
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maintenance and removal of gates over B system county 
highways shall be deemed to apply retrospectively to 
all such gates in existence on the effective date of 
this act." (emphasis added) 
Section 27-12-24 provides that all actions involving 
determination of a priority of public use regarding highways and 
roadways not otherwise designated "shall be by the County 
Attorney under and by the direction of the County legislative 
body in which the so-designated way resides." 
Section 27-12-25 provides as follows: 
"Control of highways, roads, paths, and ways not 
otherwise designated. 
All highways, roads, paths, and ways not designated as 
a federal, state, city, or special highway, road, path 
or way shall remain under the direction of the county 
executive in the county where they are located." 
Section 27-12-26 provides as follows: 
:,County executive to keep plats of roads and highways. 
It shall be the duty of the county executive of each 
county to determine all county roads existing in its 
county, outside its cities and towns, and to prepare 
and keep current plats and specific descriptions of the 
same and of such other highways as he may from time to 
time locate upon public lands, which shall be kept on 
file in the Office of the County Clerk or Recorder." 
(emphasis added) 
Note carefully that the basic statute concerning dedication, 
Section 27-12-89, provides that a highway is deemed to have 
become dedicated and abandoned to the public at the end of a 
continuous ten-year period, and not when someone goes to Court to 
make a claim. Also note that under Section 27-12-90, once a 
highway becomes established, it continues to be so established 
until abandoned or vacated by order of the highway authority. 
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Sections 27-12-102.1 through 27-12-102.5 deal with the 
process for vacating or abandoning county roads. Roads cannot be 
vacated or abandoned simply by non-use; the county executive (the 
County Commission in the situation of Box Elder County) must go 
through a formal process and take formal action. See Western 
Kane Counry Special Service District vs. Jackson, 744 P2d 1376 
(Utah 1987), v/here the Supreme Court found that a roadway used by 
the public from 1919 to 1931 was still a public roadway more than 
50 years later where no formal vacating had occurred, and even 
though the road had not been used for that entire period of time. 
Also see Kohler vs. Martin, 916 P2d 910 (Utah, 1996). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Court erred by stating that the Ridge Road was used 
sole]y for the purpose of recreation and by using that finding as 
a basis for refusing to create a public roadway. 
2. The Court erred in its determination that even though 
the Ridge Road had been used excess of ten years, the use was 
neither continuous nor as a public thoroughfare. 
3. The Court erred by considering the landowner' s intent in 
determining whether the Ridge Road was dedicated to public use. 
4. The Court erred by failing to consider the lack of 
assertion oE ownership of the road by the landowners, especially 
Barnes and Heaton. 
5. The Court erred by failing to consider abundant 
testimony regarding the public1 s understanding regarding use of 
the Ridge Road and the concomitant public use of the Ridge Road. 
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6, The Court erred by failing to create a right of public 
access over the Ridge Road for the deer hunting season. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT THE RIDGE ROAD 
WAS USED SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF RECREATION 
AND BY USING THAT FINDING AS A BASIS FOR 
CONCLUDING THE ROAD WAS NOT A PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE. 
Based upon testimony elicited at the preliminary injunction 
hearing and the May 30 hearing, there were thirty-six different 
usages of the Ridge Road. Although many of these pertained to 
hunting, other uses were established by the testimony. 
1. Study of the effect of loco weed on cattle (Lynn James, 
Utah State University professor, (Record, page 621). 
2. Collection of loco weed to take back for research 
purposes to the laboratory, (Record, page 630). 
3. Observation of Cattle, (Record, page 630). 
4. Quarrying operations, (Plaintiff s Complaint, Paragraph 
6; Record, page 002). 
5. Private seasonal sheep track, (Plaintiff's Complaint, 
Paragraph 5; Record, page 002). 
6. U.S. Forest Service used the road so that their 
personnel could more easily access certain portions of Forest 
Service property to seed meadows on the mountains, (Plaintiff s 
Complaint, Paragraph 7; Record, page 002). 
7. Box Elder County surveyor used it for county surveying 
work, (Record, page 232). 
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8. U.S. Forest Service would take their equipment and 
"stuff" up when needed, (Record, page 311). 
9. People hauling wood to their farms, (Record, page 330). 
10. Sheep camps, (Record, page 330). 
11. U.S. Forest Service took drills up there and did a 
spraying job, (Record, page 346). 
12. Installation of a big fence "up on top", (Record, page 
355) . 
13. Took salt up there for the cows on top of the mountain, 
(Record, page 355). 
14. U.S. Forest Service put water bars so people could 
make it up, (Record, page 336). 
15. Pulled trailers up the road at one time, (Record, page 
448) . 
16. Deer hunting, (Record, page 385). 
17. Camping, (Record, page 386), (Record, page 423). 
18. Spotting, (Record, page 386). 
19. Coyote hunting, (Record, page 396). 
20. Sightseeing, (Record, page 386). 
21. Fishing, (Record, page 423). 
22. Pine nut hunting, (Record, page 438). 
23. Exploring, (Record, page 438). 
24. Rattlesnake hunting, (Record, page 457). 
25. Mountain lion hunting, (Record, page 467). 
26. Prospecting, (Record, page 467). 
27. Looking for plants, (Record, page 467). 
28. Bobcat hunting, (Record, page 488). 
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29. Shooting pot guts, (Record, page 490). 
30. Snowmobiling, (Record, page 490). 
31. Scouting deer, (Record, page 490). 
32. Bow hunting, (Record, page 491). 
33. Sage hen hunting, (Record, page 511). 
34. Pine hen hunting, (Record, page 513). 
35. ATV riding, (Record, page 459). 
36. Chicken hunting, (Record, page 251). 
(In fairness, it should be noted that four of these uses 
relate to bird hunting, although perhaps different kinds of 
birds.) 
Due to the plethora of uses, the Court's factual finding 
that the Ridge Road was used solely for recreation is unsupported 
by the testimony. Secondly, even if the road was used solely for 
recreation, the Court was unable to cite any authority 
supporting its conclusion that such use does not support a public 
dedication. Certainly, the relevant statute makes no distinction 
in the type of use necessary to create a public road. The trial 
court simply stated that "historically" Section 27-12-89 has been 
involved when a road was used for multiple purposes. (Record, 
page 595). Furthermore, the Court arbitrarily and without any 
basis in law or fact chose to lump together many types of uses 
under the heading "recreational"; logically, a dozen or more 
different recreational type uses could be considered "multiple" 
or "various" uses, i.e., snowmobiling, shooting, and scouting 
deer. 
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The Court cited no case law and there is none known to the 
undersigned to the effect that various recreational uses cannot 
establish public use. In fact, in Kohler vs. Martin, 916 P2d 910 
(Utah 1996), the Court sustained a finding that a roadway used 
for recreational purposes was a public roadway, under Section 27-
12-89. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT EVEN 
THOUGH THE RIDGE ROAD HAD BEEN USED IN EXCESS 
OF TEN YEARS, THE USE WAS NEITHER CONTINUOUS 
NOR AS A PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE. 
The Court found that Box Elder County met its burden, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that the public had used the road 
for more than ten continuous years prior to 1994, but only during 
the general deer season. (Record, page 567). The Court then 
stated, "I have no authorities, and counsel both acknowledge to 
me that they can' t find any, to say that I can identify a public 
way that only exists for a few days each year." (Record, page 
567). The District Court erred in its factual finding that the 
use was only during the general deer season (See Point I). The 
court also erred in its legal conclusion that a public road 
cannot arise from seasonal use. First, this road is impassable, 
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as acknowledged by the District Court, for approximately seven 
months out of the year. (Record, page 590). Secondly, there was 
ample testimony that the road was used continuously by the public 
during the season when it was passable, not just during the deer 
hunt. 
Mr. James Barnes stated that he used the Ridge Road 
"probably between ten and fifteen times" during the summer and 
fall. (Record, page 319). Alan Smart testified that he used the 
Ridge Road two or three weekends per month to camp during the 
summer. (Record, page 471-472). He also stated that he went 
coyote hunting from October to March for two or three weekends 
per month (Record, page 470). Alan Smart also testified that he 
used the road probably four or five times a year (Record, page 
473-474). Brady Austin testified that he used the Ridge Road to 
hunt almost every weekend. (Record, page 489). Lynn James, a 
Utah State University professor, stated he performed his weekly 
collections and observations beginning in June and used the road 
about ten times each year through September. (Record, page 630). 
The Trial Court erred when it determined that the Ridge 
Road' s use was neither continuous nor as a public thoroughfare, 
given the above testimony, other testimony, and the fact that the 
road is impassable for approximately seven months out of the 
year. 
Section 27-12-89, in requiring continuous use, means on a 
year-to-year basis. Even if the road is used less, or not at 
all, during certain seasons of the year, public use may clearly 
be established on a seasonal basis. See Jeremy vs. Bertagnole, 
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116 P2d 420, (Utah 1941), at page 424, where the Court stated: 
"True, such testimony does not reveal that any witness 
used the road at weekly, monthly, or even yearly 
intervals over a period of ten years; but from the 
evidence adduced, the inference is clearly a reasonable 
one that the road was used for the driving of cattle 
and sheep for a number of years in excess of that 
required, whenever it was necessary or convenient for 
the members of the public... to so use it." 
The court upheld a trial court finding of a public roadway. 
Also see Boyer vs. Clark, 326 P2d 107, (Utah 1958) at page 
109, where the Court stated that: 
"..., the public even though not consisting of a great 
many persons, made continuous and uninterrupted use of 
Middle Canyon Road in traveling... as often as they 
found it convenient or necessary." 
The court reversed a lower court finding that the roadway 
had not become a public road. 
The logical extension of the Trial Court's reasoning that 
"continuous" means "all the time" has no end. Under such an 
interpretation, would the use have to be daily, or weekly, or 
would a car have to travel by every hour, every twelve hours, 
every twenty-four hours, or must the traffic be bumper to bumper? 
The proper definition of continuous use may also be found in 
related law dealing with prescriptive easements, where the same 
issue arises in different context. In Richards vs. Pines Ranch, 
559 P2d 948 (Utah, 1957} plaintiffs (the parties who were seeking 
to establish a private prescriptive easement) and their 
predecessors in interest had crossed the land of defendants for 
approximately forty years, using a rough road which was the 
subject matter of the lawsuit for purposes of getting to their 
property for the grazing of sheep, cutting of timber, taking of 
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Christmas trees, camping, picnics, horseback riding, and other 
such seasonal uses. 
At the trial, the Judge dismissed plaintiff's Complaint, 
finding that the roadway had been used only sporadically, and 
therefore, that the evidence was insufficient to show the use was 
so regular, open, notorious, and continuous as to establish a 
prescriptive easement. The trial court also found that in recent 
years prior to the filing of the Complaint, the use had become 
permissive, more or less, and for these reasons dismissed the 
Complaint. 
The issue on appeal was one of how much use must be made by 
the person claiming the easement. The Court's finding was that 
even a minimal use may establish a prescriptive easement. 
"It would seem that His Honor also erred in thinking 
that the adverse use had to be regular. All that is 
required is that the use be as often as required by the 
owner of the dominant estate." (Richardsf p 959) 
Continuing in Richards vs. Pines Ranch, again on page 959, 
the Court favorably quoted from a treatise on real property as 
follows: 
"The law is set out correctly in 1 Thompson on Real 
Property, Specific Easement, Section 464, page 575 
(1924), as follows: A way may be established by 
prescription without direct evidence of its actual use 
during each year. A use may be continuous though not 
constant. A right-of-way means a right to pass over 
another's land, more or less frequently, according to 
the nature of the use to be made by the easement; and 
how frequently is immaterial provided it occurred as 
often as the claimant had occasion or chose to pass." 
Also see Crane vs. Crane, 683 P2d 1062 (Utah 1984), where 
the court stated: 
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ffA use need not be 'regular* or 'constant1 in order to 
be 'continuous1. All that is necessary is that the use 
be as often as reguired by the nature of the use and 
the needs of the claimant." (p. 1064) 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED BY CONSIDERING THE LANDOWNER1 S INTENT. 
The Court erred when it stated:, "In addition, the 
Campbells' never intended that the Ridge Road be dedicated to the 
public use." (Record, page 594). According to current law, it 
is not necessary to prove the owner' s intent Thurman v. Byram, 
626 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981). See also Leo H. Bertagnole Inc. v. 
Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981). 
The one and only reguirement for establishing a road as a 
public roadway is that it be continuously used by members of the 
general public for at least ten years. See Thurman vs. Bryan, 
626 P2ci 447 (Utah 1981), Draper City vs. Estate of Bernardo, 909 
P2d 225 (Utah 1995), Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. vs. Pine Meadows 
Ranches, 639 P2d 211 (Utah 1981). 
An early line of Utah cases, subseguently over-ruled, 
reguired evidence of intent by the landowner to dedicate the 
road, but allowed that intent to be inferred by declarations, 
acts, or circumstances and use by the general public. See Morris 
vs. Blunt, 171 P 1127 (Utah 1916); Gillmor vs. Carter, 391 P2d 
426 (Utah 1964). In Thurman vs. Byram, "plaintiffs sought a 
determination that the road coursing through defendants' land had 
been used by the general public for a period in excess of ten 
years prior to defendants' installation of a gate blocking the 
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road in 1978 and that the road had thus become a public road." 
(page 448). The court held that "it is not necessary to prove 
the owner's intent to offer the road to the public... Section 
27-12-89 deems a dedication to the public as a matter of law when 
the required public use is established." (page 449) 
Approximately ten months after deciding Thurman, the same 
court decided Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. vs. Pine Meadows Ranches, 
639 P2d 211 (Utah 1981). In Bertagnole, owners sought to quiet 
title to property including the first 500 feet of a road that was 
more than seven miles long. The owners contended that 
acquiescence in the use of land does not establish the necessary 
intent to dedicate property to the public use. The court held: 
"Such is not the law. There is no need to prove the landowner's 
intent." (p. 213) 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THE LACK 
OF ASSERTION OF OWNERSHIP OF THE ROAD BY THE LANDOWNERS. 
If the Plaintiffs or Third-Party Defendants intended to show 
ownership of the road, they would have exercised ownership rights 
recognized by all who use the road. However, such was not the 
case. Even Lamont Campbell, the primary plaintiff in this case, 
by his own admission, stated that he never kicked anybody off 
"just for driving on the road." (Record, page 270). Lamont 
Campbell further stated that there was only one time, one year 
when the road wasn' t opened about the last 30 or 40 years. 
(Record, page 279). Dean Barnes, another landowner, stated that 
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last year (1995) was the first year he locked his gate. (Record, 
page 301). Sam Ospital, who lived for years at the Scoffield 
access, testified that some years they've locked the gate and 
other years they haven1 t for the whole year. (Record, page 326-
327). Larry Kempton testified that the forest service has never 
stopped the public from going up there. (Record, page 346). 
David Conger testified that he never asked for permission to use 
the road and had never seen a locked gate (Record, page 387-388). 
James Patterson never sought permission to use the road and never 
saw signs or a lock on any gate, even though he used the road 
from 1980-1989. (Record, page 398). Monty Jones never asked 
permission and never saw locked gates even though he used the 
road from the 1960s through 1979. (Record, page 425-426). Alan 
Burt, whose testimony is very compelling, stated that there were 
no locked gates on the Ridge Road until 1993. (Record, page 441-
442). Allen Bourne never saw a locked gate. (Record, page 459). 
Brady Austin never encountered any locked gates nor obtained 
permission even though he used the road 15 times since 1989. 
(Record, page 491-493). Clayton Morrill never saw a gate locked 
for 10-15 years and never asked permission. (Record, page 538). 
Lynn James stated he never saw any signs saying no trespassing. 
(Record, page 628). David Hacking never experienced a locked 
gate and never saw a "no trespassing" sign. (Record, page 638-
639). Finaily, and possibly most importantly, the parties 
stipulated that prior to 1994 there were never any locked gates 
on the Barnes and Heaton sections of the road. Accordingly, most 
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of the testimony centered on the Campbell gates, (Record, page 
648) . 
As earlier noted, Barnes and Heaton did absolutely nothing 
to assert ownership. In fact, neither of them even contended 
that they had ever locked any gates or done anything to interfere 
with public use before 1994. 
Based upon this cumulative testimony, there is no guestion 
that the landowners, especially Barnes and Heaton, failed to 
assert any rights of ownership over the road and therefore the 
road was a public thoroughfare used continuously for at least ten 
years. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER ABUNDANT 
TESTIMONY REGARDING THE PUBLIC' S UNDERSTANDING 
REGARDING USE OF THE RIDGE ROAD AND THE 
CONCOMITANT PUBLIC USE OF THE RIDGE ROAD. 
The public1 s understanding regarding the use of the Ridge 
Road and their concomitant use of the road should be persuasive 
in determining if the road became dedicated to the public. 
James Patterson testified "It* s my understanding that the 
roads that are not purposefully blocked off are public roads; and 
that a lot of those public roads go across private land." 
(Record, page 407). Donald Peterson, an employee of the U.S. 
Forest Service, testified that he was not personally aware of any 
agreement that the Ridge Road would not become a public road. 
(Record, page 412). Alan Burt testified that he thought the 
Ridge Road was a county road. (Record, page 444). Alan Smart 
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testified that he knew the road went to forest service property. 
(Record, page 476). Brady Austin testified that he understood 
the public was allowed to go through the land because the road 
leads to National Forest service land. (Record, Page 495) . 
Larall Thompson stated that he felt like it was a road going up 
into the National Forest and he didn' t feel like he needed 
permission. (Record, page 517). In addition to their 
understandings regarding where the Ridge Road led and how it was 
used, all of these witnesses personally used the Ridge Road as a 
public thoroughfare. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CREATE A 
RIGHT OF PUBLIC ACCESS OVER THE RIDGE 
ROAD FOR THE DEER HUNTING SEASON 
The Trial Judge, in his Memorandum Decision (Record, 
page 595), referred in a footnote to what he called a "time share 
model". Appellant argued at trial, and asserts on appeal, that 
continuous use means seasonal use, as discussed above in this 
brief, and that based thereon the road became dedicated to the 
public. 
As an alternative, appellant argued at trial that even using 
the Court's findings, conclusions, and interpretations of the 
law, all provisions of the statute were met during the general 
deer season each year for the entire roadway, including the 
Campbell property. Therefore, the public should have a right of 
access during the general deer hunt, even if no public right of 
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access is created during any other time of year. 
In the referenced footnote, the Court refers to this as a 
"time share model", and even states that while such a solution 
might be fair and equitable, the Court was not aware of any 
precedent. 
Interestingly, the Court could not recite any precedent for 
its conclusion that solely recreational use does not create a 
public right-of-way. 
Admittedly, there is no direct precedent in Utah for the 
public having a right-of-way two weeks out of the year and the 
roadway being private the balance of the time. It is 
respectfully submitted that no such precedent exists because use 
two weeks out of the year makes the road abandoned and dedicated 
to the public, under the facts and circumstances of this case. 
By the same token, no precedent exists prohibiting such a "time 
share". 
By analogy, there is; precedent for private easements to 
exist seasonally, or for limited times and limited purposes. See 
Point II above. 
It is respectfully submitted that the public, like any 
individual or entity, could acquire a right of use for two weeks 
out of the year, during the general deer season. Nothing in the 
statute prohibits such an approach. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court erred by stating that the Ridge Road was used 
solely for the purpose of recreation. The great weight of 
testimony contradicts this finding. Even if the sole purpose was 
recreational, the statute and case law make no distinctions 
between types of uses, and the Court failed to cite any case law 
supporting its conclusions that recreational use cannot result in 
a dedication to the public. The Court erred in its determination 
that the public's use was neither continuous nor as a public 
thoroughfare. The testimony given by numerous witnesses supports 
the position that the use was continuous during those periods 
when the road was passable. 
The Court erred by treating the Campbell portion of the 
roadway in the same manner as the Barnes/Heaton portion. The 
facts regarding the two sections are fundamentally different, 
compelling a finding that the Barnes/Heaton portion was always a 
public roadway. 
The Court erred when it considered the landowner' s intent. 
The Court also erred when it failed to consider the stipulated 
3ack of assertion of ownership of the road by Barnes and Heaton, 
who did nothing to assert private ownership of the Ridge Road 
until 1994. However, that was after the time the Court found the 
public had used the road for ten years. 
Finally, the Court erred by failing to consider the abundant 
testimony regarding the public* s understanding of the Ridge Road 
and their concomitant use of the Ridge Road. The Ridge Road was 
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a road that was viewed by the public as a public road and their 
use mirrored that viewpoint. 
In short, the public has met the statutory requirement of 
27-12-89 because the public has used the road continuously as a 
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years. Therefore the 
highway shall be deemed dedicated and abandoned to the use of the 
public. 
Appellants respectfully request this Court to reverse the 
Trial Court and direct that the entire road be declared public. 
As an alternative, the portion of the road that traverses the 
Heaton and Barnes properties should be declared public, even if 
the Campbell portion is not. Finally, as a last alternative, the 
entire road should at least be declared public during the general 
deer season. N 
DATED t h i s / / ciay of JyJzLe^AttL 1997. 
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DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS 
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APPENDIX 
ITEM 
Copy of Defendant's Exhibit #1, 
Map of Road and Area 
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